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Introduction
n the present article, we discuss the importance
of integrating the self, self-awareness, and inter-subjec-
tivity in models of social cognitive neuroscience and psy-
chiatric research while striving to progress in the under-
standing and treatment of psychiatric disorders. 
The self is central to human cognition.
1 It involves multi-
ple levels of representation with the psychosocial func-
tion of articulating the individual with the group. A work-
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In the following article we present a view that social cognition and social neuroscience, as shaped by the current
research paradigms, are not sufficient to improve our understanding of psychopathological phenomena. We hold
that the self, self-awareness, and inter-subjectivity are integral to social perception and actions. In addition, we
emphasize that the self and self-awareness are, by their very nature and function, involved over the entire lifespan
with the way the individual is perceived in the social environment. Likewise, the modes of operation and identifi-
cation of the self and self-awareness receive strong developmental contributions from social interactions with
parental figures, siblings, peers, and significant others. These contributions are framed by a competitive and coop-
erative struggle for love and recognition. We suggest that in humans social cognitive neuroscience should be
informed by a thoughtful appreciation of the equal significance of the struggle for “life” and that for love and
recognition. In order to be better positioned to improve the research agenda and practice of clinical psychiatry, we
propose that cognitive and social neurosciences explicitly incorporate in their models phenomena relative to the
self, self-awareness, and inter-subjectivity.      
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symbolic essential qualities and personality traits
2 that
make a person distinct from others, but also similar, not
only by way of genes, but also group identification and
belonging. Self-awareness may be defined by the ongoing
cognition of being the agent and the owner of one’s own
thoughts and actions through time, and of having a self
that is constantly concerned with one’s own perception
and judgment, and those of others.
3We may define inter-
subjectivity as the interplay among multiple self-aware-
nesses interacting in interpersonal relationships, as
framed by human societies. 
The phenomena captured by these definitions and their
corollaries can be further understood by considering the
self and self-awareness as parts of an evolutionary process
that relates to the emergence of unique forms of interper-
sonal relationships only known in human societies.
Through evolution, the struggle for the self among humans
has progressively gained a weight that is commensurate to,
or greater than, the immediate struggle for survival.
Challenging external and internal demands are imposed
on the self because of the ongoing competitive and col-
laborative struggle for attention, love, and recognition. The
self and self-awareness, and therefore inter-subjective rela-
tionships are strongly determined developmentally and
through all stages of life by social (including family) inter-
actions.
4 They play a critical role in the way individuals
cope with self-representation and influence each other
through their patterns of projections.
5
Thus, we suggest that basic (fear, sadness, anger, happi-
ness, etc) and social (pride, embarrassment, shame, etc)
emotions largely depend, in their elicitation and in the
narrative that surrounds them, on the cognitive stance
of the self situated in real, imaginary, or symbolic rela-
tionships with the physical and social context. Likewise,
self-esteem represents a central aspect of emotional life
as it relates to social integration and rejection.
6-10 It is
meaningfully related to the self-concept, self-image, and
the awareness the subject has of his or her self-concept
and self-image. Low self-esteem is directly linked to a
representation of the self that struggles with the fear of
a narcissistic failure.
11,12 Self-esteem is sensitive to chal-
lenges, and a critical function that is affected in various
psychiatric disorders, from mood to anxiety and person-
ality disorders.
13 At the core of much psychiatric suffer-
ing (eg, depression, social anxiety, personality disorders)
lies an attempt to cope with real or imaginary separation
and rejection distress.
6
Thus, self-knowledge and representations of others tend
to be highly biased,
14,15 because acceptance, rejection, and
separation distress may have far-reaching consequences
for the self. The infant self tends to be defensively struc-
tured to fend off challenges and attacks. Without adap-
tive transformations involving reality appraisal, reap-
praisal, learning, and maturation, coping mechanisms
can reach the magnitude of prevalent ideas, and even
delusions, developed in order to protect the projected
identity of the self. Under this view, self-awareness is the
main hub of social cognition and inter-subjectivity.
Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists often take care of
individuals who struggle with their own relationship to
their selves and the way their selves relate to otherness,
at various real, imaginary, and symbolic levels. We find
that asking what psychological mechanisms operate
behind a person that sees his or her self as a failure, for
instance, is a valid clinical question. We can wonder to
what extent the patient’s view of his or her self is a
“social one” and what roles others (society?) play in the
patient’s imaginary and symbolic relationships (either as
judging and punishing or rewarding agencies).
16
Social cognitive neuroscience and the self
Standard contemporary definitions of social cognition in
cognitive neuroscience emphasize the encoding, storage,
retrieval, and processing of information relating to mem-
bers of the same species. Social cognition encompasses
elements of cognition relating to information and knowl-
edge, supporting and guiding adaptive behaviors of the
individual as a member of a group or society. It is gen-
erally acknowledged that this information is often (but
not exclusively) emotionally charged. Research in social
cognitive neuroscience has been concerned with the
mechanisms of social perception at the system level (eg,
frontal lobes)
17 and molecular (eg, neurohormones)
level.
18 Often the focus has been on the mechanisms of
perception of certain categories of stimuli (eg, faces vs
objects or scenes) and, more generally, on the correlates
of the categorical apprehension of social attributes or
emotions (eg, contempt, fear, empathy), but also on deci-
sion making and the ability for a theory of mind,
19
attachment, and social exploration.
20
Psychiatry research has adopted questions and methods
of social cognitive neuroscience to study disorders with
real-life abnormalities in social adaptation and interac-
tion including autism, schizophrenia, and personality and
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mood disorders.
21 Broadly, the goal of this effort has
been to identify “endophenotypes” or to uncover basic
mechanisms that underlie psychiatric conditions, and
that would provide potential targets for biomedical
treatments.
20 Social neuroscience has proven effective in
eliciting general cognitive and neural mechanisms
involved in processing “socially relevant” material.
Nonetheless, well-controlled laboratory procedures are
most often devoid of personal relevance for the exam-
ined participants. This limits the specificity of the emo-
tional resonance (and thus the self-relevance) of the
experimental results.
22 The current social cognitive
approach leaves self, self-awareness, and inter-subjectiv-
ity unaccounted for in the background where they (as
self-image and self-esteem) influence perception, mem-
ory, and other cognitive processes concerning socially
relevant interactions.
14,15,23
We argue that a mature social cognitive neuroscience
aimed at having fundamental relevance to psychiatry
should therefore not deliberately choose to ignore it for
methodological and epistemological convenience. There
is a fundamental gap between the type of phenomena
currently studied and the type of psychological models
that would be necessary to understand and approach
human social cognition. The knowledge accumulated by
general cognitive and social neuroscience and its appli-
cation to psychiatry, while representing progress, remains
inadequate to address the challenges faced by psychia-
try or more generally by any field striving to understand
human psychology and psychopathology. 
Relevant levels of integration such as self-awareness and
inter-subjectivity still escape the reach of biomedical sci-
ence, and integrating such levels into research will be a
challenge. Models integrating social cognition with
aspects of the self and psychopathology have been pro-
posed for brain damage occurring during developmen-
tal ages.
24Yet, it will be essential to invest in research and
clinical practice seeking a more comprehensive under-
standing of the levels of representation and mechanisms
at stake in human social cognition as it relates to psy-
chopathology, including in individuals without gross
brain damage. We argue that no satisfactory under-
standing of human social cognition and psychopathol-
ogy will be possible without making psychological con-
structs such as the self, self-awareness, and more
generally consciousness, the unconscious and inter-sub-
jectivity integral to (formal) models of social cognitive
neuroscience. 
It will be essential to understand how the self, as a
socially laden system, structures its relationships to the
categories of self and otherness, in the context of the
processes that are central to the making of human iden-
tity, representations and coping strategies, throughout
development. An understanding of the importance of
introducing the self in the discourse of cognitive neuro-
science might come from an appreciation of the press-
ing nature of this problem, as other investigators have
already acknowledged. The necessity of a paradigm shift
in social and affective neuroscience including the first-
person perspective has been advocated.
22,25-29
Clinical vignettes
A few vignettes of common complaints presenting in
clinical psychiatry practice illustrate the importance of
having an integrated model of social cognition that cap-
tures concepts related to the self. 
￿ A college graduate unmarried mature woman had
been treated for three cosyndromal DSM-IV
30 axis I
disorders (depression, anorexia nervosa, and alco-
holism) since her mid-20s with antidepressants and
psychotherapy, without much result. Patterns of bore-
dom, inconsistency with relationships, and reckless
behavior and mistrust strongly suggested personality
disorder traits. Social perceptual difficulties were
expected based on the literature but it was unclear
whether they were to be attributed to depression,
31 eat-
ing,
32 or personality disorder.
33 Symptom and social
cognition (ie, mentalizing or the ability to read other
people’s intentions and mental states) improvement
began when issues related to perceived or real sexual
abuse from the father during her childhood and the
consequences these events had on the perception of
her self were addressed. 
￿ A pre-eminent middle-aged man was treated with
medication and psychotherapy for symptoms consis-
tent with depression. He appeared to have no other
comorbid personality traits or psychiatric disorders.
Social cognitive problems were evident, and from time
to time gave way to full paranoid symptoms. During
psychotherapy, shame for being an older gay man with-
out a partner and envy of heterosexual persons with a
family became the focus of therapy, and led to appre-
ciation of the possible role of hitherto-uncovered
childhood neglect, yielding some relief before the
patient moved to a larger city. 
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￿ An accomplished young woman came to consultation
complaining of worsening dysphoria and anxiety that
began after she rushed into a marriage with an old
high-school boyfriend, after abruptly leaving the man
she had lived with happily for many years and whom
she had loved all along and continued to love. With
psychotherapy the patient realized that her decision
was based on prepotent expectations (from the self) to
get married and have a family before her mid-30s,
something she perceived the man she loved was not
ready to take on. After a few months of marriage, she
divorced and went back to the relationship with the
former man. 
These examples show that mechanisms of social per-
ception and self-awareness tend to be entangled in psy-
chiatric disorders, and are major psychopathological and
treatment factors. Personality disorders are extremely
common (up to 50%) in psychiatric practice
34 and clearly
affect treatment outcome of axis I disorders.
35
Psychotherapeutic models stressing change occurring at
the level of the self and perceptions of the self have been
highlighted in recent meta-analyses showing compara-
ble efficacy to medications
36,37 and effectiveness.
38
Domains of social cognitive neuroscience:
strengths and limits
Social cognitive neuroscience has emphasized that
apprehending and coping with socially relevant mater-
ial heavily relies on general cognitive abilities, such as
perception, attention, memory, and language. These abil-
ities and the brain systems related to them are critically
engaged in processing discriminating features (from
physical traits to abstract principles) that are important
for guiding choice preference, group belonging/forma-
tion, and other species-specific activities, and more gen-
erally for optimizing social interactions, with con-specifics
(eg, friends, family, coworkers) or institutions. The notion
of “social interactions” is often intended as the interplay
between cooperation and competition among individu-
als and groups (family, kinship, hierarchical dominance)
of the same species. Under such a view, an operating
model for the self is left implicit in the background and
is similar in its assumptions to the classical economic
agent.
39 This implicit operating model of the self is also
framed in reference to Darwinian evolution and the
struggle for life. The current success of the field of neu-
roeconomics stems apparently from such a view.
40-42
In the field of social cognitive neuroscience, a substantial
crosstalk exists between animal and human research.
Evolutionary hypotheses and a comparative perspective
have become integral to the normal discourse on social
cognition and to the endeavor of uncovering treatments
for psychiatry, based on the paradigm of animal models.
The field seems to be generally highly receptive to sci-
entific work telling stories of overlap between findings
from animal models and human studies (eg, amygdala
and fear, or striatum and reward
43,44). In spite of the large
and still-developing research effort, including functional
neuroimaging, few hypotheses have emerged that are
autochthonous to human research and reach a plausible
level of psychological integration (eg, see literature on
Default Mode Network
45,46). 
The progression of the application to humans of
hypotheses related to animal research (an ambitious
research program that has been pursued over a few
decades that has seen some exceptional developments
(eg, refs 47,48) while seeking the precision necessary to
a scientific field has so far led to the development of a
social neuroscience that has not adequately addressed
some critical issues (for relative exceptions see refs 49-
51). 
When borrowing from animal studies to develop
hypotheses on humans that are directly relevant to psy-
chiatry, an example of a critical question is to what
extent animal emotions are germane to the homologous
emotions in humans (beyond the use of common termi-
nology and reference to a common evolutionary back-
ground). One is left to wonder how much an emotion
among humans is generated by social events that are
inescapably influenced by the interpretations of the self,
by self-awareness and inter-subjectivity. For instance, the
psychological underpinnings of “depression” in humans
may lie in social emotions (eg, envy and a following
sense of inferiority or impotence) that are arguably
primitive to depression. The future challenge will be to
determine the degree to which animals that appear to
undergo social emotions (eg, the Capuchin monkey)
including envy,
52 develop depression as a result of being
placed in envy-generating conditions. A critical emotion
experienced during the depressive illness is sadness, an
emotion typically construed as “basic,” 
53 but which in
humans has a large social component, both in its causes
(eg, loss of a loved one) and in its consequences (eg, guilt
for not being able to maintain a certain social role as a
result of being sad or depressed; for guilt as a social emo-
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mountain climber in potential danger has levels of social
complexity that are unlikely to be reached in mice. In
addition to fearing his own end, the mountain climber
anticipating a possible death is likely also to be scared of
losing his spouse and children, of leaving them behind,
alone and fatherless and exposed to dangers, of the
financial consequences of his death on them, of the emo-
tional effects on his parents, and so on. He may simulta-
neously experience shame (another social emotion) and
anger (perhaps towards his self) for having neglected
what he thinks were routine safety measures. A human
facing the possibility of ceasing to exist very soon has
emotions that encompass the inescapable social nature
and interconnectedness of our species, and multiple lev-
els of self-representation and projection. Therefore, it is
legitimate to wonder in which way the literature on basic
and social emotions in animals, as it is usually framed, is
truly useful for an extended view of social cognition and
understaging of normal and abnormal emotions in
humans. Are animal models for psychiatry at this stage
of research adequate for psychiatry practice? 
The brain rush: historical perspective
In recent years, there has been an impetus towards
understanding how social cognitive processes are
“mapped” in the brain. Social neuroscience has used
experimental paradigms borrowed from the social and
cognitive sciences, studying for instance the perception
of socially relevant stimuli (eg, facial recognition of iden-
tity [gender] and emotion; categorization [personality,
identity, emotion]; discrimination [race]) but also deci-
sion-making and theory of mind. An extensive exposition
of the brain mechanisms purported to subserve social
cognitive processes is beyond the scope of this article (we
refer instead to several excellent reviews).
55-57 It will suf-
fice to say here that brain structures emerging as poten-
tially related to social cognitive processes (including the
amygdala, insular cortex, orbital frontal ventral medial
complex, the right parietal cortex, and temporal lobe)
show multiple areas of overlap with brain regions impli-
cated in the pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders.
58 In
addition, the appreciation of the neurohumoral modula-
tion of social processes (eg, oxytocin/vasopressin, endor-
phin, and dopamine systems) appears to many as a
promising ground to understand psychiatric disorders
and devise new effective medications.
20
Current research in social cognition and social neuro-
science is historically related to academic cognitive psy-
chology whose theories and experimental paradigms
provided fertile ground for the early development of
cognitive neuroscience in the beginning era of noninva-
sive human functional neuroimaging.
59 Some academic
social psychologists were also well positioned to take
advantage of the new technologies.
60 Typically these
approaches have not been developed starting from an
integrative theory of the self and self-awareness, and the
struggle with the demands of human life. Conversely,
scholars interested in psychodynamic approaches (struc-
turally equipped and interested in developing a dis-
course on various aspects of the self and self-awareness
in social interactions), have lagged behind in the devel-
opment of experimental approaches (but see the recent
endeavor of the Society for Neuropsychoanalysis and
related work).
47,61
Therefore, historical contingencies and the global readi-
ness of a field to embrace the new scientific outlets
rather than cogency of psychological models and their
potential applicability to the clinical reality influenced
the research agenda in social neuroscience. One is left
to wonder if cognitive sciences, as they seek an under-
standing of the human mind and psychiatric phenom-
ena, have reflected adequately on the nature of their
object of inquiry. Essential conceptualizations have
been excluded in the name of Ockham’s Razor (or lex
parsimoniae, law of parsimony), in a way that tends to
lead to an eliminativist reductionism. A valid object of
research has been partially lost and perhaps under-
mined by an “epistemological obstacle.” 
62 In regard to
its application to psychiatry, social cognitive neuro-
science may even represent an involution relative to rel-
evant conceptual framework and tools already available
for clinicians.
63
A narrow view of social cognition applied to psychiatry
understands the person to be studied as an object whose
properties are measured in order to uncover purported
elementary social cognitive processes (eg, perception of
facial expression, instrumental learning, etc) and their
mechanisms to predict social functioning, adaptation,
and outcome. These putative elementary processes are
often studied with the goal of (re)defining nosology,
identifying potential endophenotypes (or heritable bio-
markers present not just during the active phase of the
illness) for specific psychiatric disorders, and targets for
novel pharmacological treatments.
64 This approach is
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limits need to be made explicit to raise awareness about
the potential risk of obliterating essential aspects of cog-
nition (in particular cognition’s integrative and complex
nature). Complexity exponentially increases during the
developmental history that humans, as selves and social
agents, undergo. Such complexity is a fundamental chal-
lenge for research which methodology and approach
demand simplification. While on the one hand science
cannot progress without some reductionism, on the
other the more reduction and simplification are infused
into the scientific approach the more this eliminates and
looses sight of the object of interest. This might be
heuristic when the objects of science turn out to behave
in a “simple” manner, like some objects of elementary
physics (eg, electromagnetic interactions between two
atoms), but this could be a major mistake, when reality
is more complex. In the era of translational science the
temptation for reductionism is quite real. This leads to a
paradox in which the fascination for technology and
hard science (and their practical inertia) may lead to a
progressive elimination from science itself of legitimate
and necessary objects of inquiry. Psychiatry needs to
reappropriate the human mind of all the aforemen-
tioned dimensions in order to define more valid research
orientations. Whereas on the one hand social cognition
is central to psychiatry, on the other hand, social cogni-
tive neuroscience applied to psychiatric research will
require a substantial maturation. 
We argue that fruitful and adequate treatments for the
existential challenges that (should) constitute the bread
and butter of everyday psychiatry cannot be achieved
satisfactorily without returning to and developing para-
digms of psychology and psychopathology that have
been neglected, and sometimes rejected for ideological
and financial reasons.
65Among these paradigms one can
list psychodynamic and systemic thinking
4,66-68 and its
application to family therapy, and refer back to integra-
tive views and theories such as the organo-dynamism
developed by Henri Ey (but the teachings of Ey and his
psychiatry manual
69,70 have unfortunately long been for-
gotten, in particular in the Anglo-Saxon world). 
The study of social cognition and social cognitive neu-
roscience in psychiatric research may have been influ-
enced by the epistemic climate that began with the first
era of psychiatric drug discovery.
71The rise of neuropsy-
chopharmacology gave the impression that bioclinical
interventions would be able to short-circuit the chal-
lenge of dealing directly with the subject, and the con-
quests of cognitive neuroscience and its methodological
success seemed to seal the deal. This substitution of the
brain to the suffering mind (and its self) as the inter-
locutor of the clinician was largely based on purported
efficiency and financial reasons
65 and it has become the
dominant paradigm. There are obvious merits to this
enterprise, but, until the fundamental connections
between the brain, the self, and self-awareness are
understood and integrated into a solid bio-psycho-social
model, the concepts and mechanisms the field actually
offers to the clinician are in a large part inadequate, and
often improperly marketed to the general public. 
Social cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry
Psychiatry has been traditionally concerned with the
inner world. Irrespective of the approach (symptom
based neo-Kraepelininan, phenomenological, dynamic,
or other), psychiatry holds profound interest in, and epis-
temic respect for, the subjective.
72 Current psychiatric
diagnosing relies on collecting symptoms largely based
on patients’ subjective perception of themselves, and of
how they believe others are and see them.
30
Cognitive neuroscience and its application to psychiatric
research have been highly productive in demonstrating
correlations between many psychiatric disorders and the
engagement of various brain systems.
58 A better under-
standing of social cognition and of its brain mechanisms
may improve prediction of course and treatment of psy-
chiatric disorders, but it is less clear, as discussed above,
how the current paradigms will improve our knowledge
of the bases of psychiatric disorders. Let’s take the exam-
ple of patients with depression. Patients with depression
are known to have a reduced degree of social adapta-
tion
73,74 and (may) show impaired recognition of emotion
from facial expressions (a paradigmatic experimental
approach in social neuroscience).
75,76 If an association
between perception of facial expressions and social
adaptation is found, it is often assumed that the difficulty
of perception is primary and etiologically related to
depression and to the social maladaptation accompany-
ing depression (and perhaps shares common brain
mechanisms). 
Generally this approach follows the “deficit” model,
even though more refined social cognitive paradigms
have begun to demonstrate that the “bias” model may
also be appropriate for understanding the social cogni-
70
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tive alterations in several psychiatric conditions.
77 In a
recent study, patients with a history of depression who
were examined while depressed showed reduced capac-
ity to appreciate stimuli conveying happiness (and not
negative emotions) relative to patients who were exam-
ined while in remission, strongly indicating that the phe-
nomenon was related to the depressive state and pur-
portedly attributable to bias (Loi et al, unpublished). For
a similar example on eating disorder research see
Pringle et al,
32 and for an example on schizophrenia see
McCormick et al.
78 Therefore, performance changes on
a social cognitive task may be useful to define prognosis
and response to treatment and even conceivably help to
give external validity to a diagnosis (ie, allowing defini-
tion of boundaries with other psychiatric conditions). It
is much less certain whether task performance will be
informative regarding the “underpinnings” of a given
disorder, and therefore enrich its construct with patho-
physiological mechanisms.
79 In contrast with what is
widely believed, low performance on a social cognitive
task has no obvious primacy status (or is gründlich, as
Germans would say) over symptoms. Therefore it is not
helpful in informing our understanding of the etiopatho-
physiology (ie, causality) of the illness, for its simultane-
ous occurrence with other measurable and non-measur-
able mental events.
64 The direction of the causal
interrelationship between the measurable (the perfor-
mance score in a task) and the mental state that sub-
tends it is not known and it is unclear whether it is even
knowable.
64To expand and clarify, objectively measured
social cognitive performance cannot be considered to be
the underpinning (much less the cause) of a disorder. It
may very well be its consequence. Whereas it is often
believed that a longitudinal design has the potential to
resolve this riddle, top-down influences on perception
have practical consequences even in research on indi-
viduals studied before the onset of the illness. In addi-
tion, astute investigators note that response to stimuli in
the laboratory is only a proxy for response to stimuli in
the real world (the problem of ecological validity).
33
Most importantly, the stimuli to which we all respond in
everyday life are critically imbued with significance
based on emotional development, patterns of attach-
ment, and defense mechanisms.
5,74The influence of these
aspects of mental life on social cognition is difficult to
study in the laboratory (but see ref 75). For this reason
perhaps, although critical to psychiatry, this research has
largely been neglected by the field. 
What social cognition 
for psychiatry?
Social cognition is thought to be affected in many psy-
chiatric and personality disorders.
31,80,81 Most social cog-
nitive neuroscience research relevant for psychiatry has
focused on third-person processing including perception,
appetitive approach, attachment, motivation, control, and
will. As mentioned above, experimental paradigms are
used with the ultimate goal of learning about fundamen-
tal mechanisms of psychiatric disorders (many of which
are associated with rather obvious clinical problems in
the social domain, eg, schizophrenia, autism) and improve
outcome prediction. For instance, much hope was placed
in this approach to schizophrenia,
82 but initial enthusiasm,
while confirming the clinical observation of social dys-
function in schizophrenia, has not translated into out-
come prediction beyond 25%.
83The reasons for this mod-
est predictive power are generally explained in many
ways ranging from methodology to illness heterogeneity.
Rarely it is entertained that the individual selves may
introduce critical variability on objectively attained group
data. Perhaps in part for this reason, objectively recorded
social cognitive data face the competition of subjective
(eg, self-report) measures often found to be of similar or
greater clinical validity.
84,85
The focus on dysfunctions of low-level perceptual
processes uncovered in social cognitive studies with psy-
chiatric populations seems to have little bearing on clin-
ical reality and mechanisms of psychiatric illness.
Particularly poignant to further explain this view are
observations on patients with focal neurological damage.
Individuals with profound anterograde amnesia due to
mesial temporal damage have dramatic social cognitive
deficits (leading to loss of most of their autonomy), but
this is not premise for a psychiatric disorder. The social
impairment that follows profound amnesia is not suffi-
cient to “give” a patient schizophrenia, depression, or
personality disorder.
86
The critical question therefore is not just whether the
findings on mental functions that have been shown to be
associated with a given psychiatric disorder are consis-
tent across studies or predict some outcome. The prob-
lem is more fundamental. Because much of our mental
life and many of the complaints that bring patients to
psychiatrists are concerned with social appraisal and its
reference to the self, the critical question is to what
extent the model of a narrow social cognition as dis-
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promising. Because social cognition is fundamentally
intertwined with self-cognition, understanding and treat-
ing psychiatric disorders requires a model of the self and
self-awareness (its construction, its identity) involving a
level of integration between social perception and self-
perception that none of the current neuroscience
approaches have proven to be able to illuminate (how-
ever, for proposals in this direction see refs 87-89). An
integrated approach to social/self cognition should direct
efforts toward understanding inter-subjective factors in
interpersonal and social-familial relationships, which are
potentially implicated in the development of psychiatric
disorders
4,66 beyond and in addition to risk factors of
genetic nature.
90The adequate level of integration is pre-
cisely that of a subject with genetic vulnerability and
with a history and a place assigned or imagined to be
assigned by others, living in a world of representations
while building a narrative about them, and coping with
conflicts and dissonances at multiple levels. 
Psychiatrists deal with complex phenomena that are
deeply rooted in early childhood and involve from the
outset the subject and the psychosocial vicissitudes of his
narcissism.
91,92The cognitive apparatus of a newborn has
to position itself in complex inter-subjective and group
dynamics, in a relation of fundamental dependence vis-
à-vis actions, representations, and narratives of others.
The newborn’s mind has to develop in a world that
imposes an ongoing selective pressure (and struggle) to
be loved, recognized, protected, and respected, entailing
the development of cognitive and behavioral strategies
to exert control over oneself and one’s own environ-
ment. As a consequence, the young human will enter
into a competitive game of personal marketing relying
on the projection of a construed self-image. The primacy
of such dynamics has reached unprecedented heights in
current human societies that are dominated by the
power of mass media and the celebrity system. 
This explains that self-awareness is organized as a pro-
jective phenomenon in which the subject sees and judges
him- or herself from the point of view of the other to
which he or she identifies.
93This leads to a form of alien-
ation in which the subject perceives him- or herself as
being an object offered in the scopic field to the gaze of
the other.
2 The extant experimental evidence demon-
strates that the subject is more self-conscious when
aware of being under observation.
94A massive reflection
of these phenomena is the contemporary “craving” for
being in front of video cameras and for reality shows.
This structural alienation is all the more significant very
early on in life because of the little human being’s con-
stant psychomotor struggle to walk, act, talk, and be
understood.
2 While the cognitive apparatus is construc-
tively open to alterity, its fundamental dependence vis-
à-vis the web of human relationships, representations
and narratives, places humans at risks of difficulties with
the distinction between self and other, authenticity and
fiction, in the process of the building of the identity of
the self. The fear of loss, separation distress, and the need
to control others as a result are central to normal and
pathological psychological development.
99 The self is
built on a fundamental defensive attitude (that when
gone awry may turn into full-blown paranoia and/or
megalomania). The developmental condition of the self
discussed here is potential ground for the psychogenesis
of much psychopathology affecting the relational world
and social communication.
96
Conclusion
It is time that the perspectives discussed above became
once again central to psychiatry research and clinical
practice. We advocate for their integration into empiri-
cal research on normal and pathological mental phe-
nomena, after theoretical reflections on formalization
and modeling, and for their incorporation into research
on development of treatment strategies. The goal of find-
ing neural correlates to various variables directly or indi-
rectly related to the psychiatric symptoms and outcome
is of potential use. New drugs developed from traditional
research approaches may continue to play an important
role in patient care. However, strategic choices of public
health policy, in terms of research financing, infrastruc-
tures, and training of clinicians would benefit from pur-
suing a more valid and comprehensive understanding of
the structure of the mind, with its levels of representa-
tion and operation, and its historical nature. We are
nonetheless aware that at this stage it is unclear to what
extent the levels of integration advocated in the present
article as central to psychiatry will have correlates that
are sufficiently simple to apply to psychopathology
97 and
lead to effective treatments. We also have to accept the
possibility that no treatment, including psychotherapeu-
tic, might come as a solution to problems that are likely
to be grounded in the developmental, individual, and
often transgenerational history of individuals. ❏
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